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COMMERCIAL LAW SURVEY

I.

OVERVIEW

During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a variety of issues within the area of commercial law. Economic
and political situations, both foreign and domestic, generated engaging
issues for appellate review. At home, the mismanagement and failure of
banks and savings and loans continued to produce a number of cases for
Tenth Circuit review. Part I of this survey will analyze two of these
cases: United States v. Davis I and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v.
Canfield.2
In Davis, the court decided those who serve a federally insured institution, whether in an employment context or in some other position of
trust, are "connected with" that institution for the purpose of conviction
for misapplying federally insured funds under 18 U.S.C. § 657.3 In Canfield, a case of first impression at the appellate level, the Tenth Circuit
held that the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement
Act (FIRREA) 4 provision allowing bank officers and directors to be held
personally liable for "gross negligence" does not bar the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) from seeking recovery against officers and directors under an ordinary negligence theory if applicable
state law allows such actions.
Executive Orders issued in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait
acted as a catalyst for a commercial law case involving letters of credit.
Part II of this survey will analyze Centrifugal Casting Machine Company v.
American Bank & Trust 5 in detail. In Centrifugal, the Tenth Circuit examined the complexities of letters of credit, reaching the conclusion that
Iraq, as account party to a letter of credit, did not have a property interest in the contract down payment made to a beneficiary, Centrifugal
Casting Machine Co. (CCM), even though CCM breached the underlying contract. As a result, the Executive Orders freezing Iraqi assets did
6
not apply to the payment.
1. 953 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2286 (1992).
2. 967 F.2d 443 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 113 S. Ct. 516 (1992).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 657 (Supp. III 1991) (it is unlawful for a person who is "an officer,
agent or employee of or connected in any capacity with" an insured institution to willfully
misapply funds belonging to the institution).
4. In 1989, in response to the large number of bank and savings and loan failures,
Congress enacted the FIRREA. FIRREA enables the FDIC to stand in the shoes of the
failed bank and its stockholders to sue the officers and directors for mismanagement under
state law. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). The
issue in the Canfield case concerned 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (Supp. 1 1989).
5. 966 F.2d 1348 (10th Cir. 1992).
6. Id at 1354.
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BANKING CASES

Background

The savings and loan (S&L) debacle represents one of the greatest
scandals in American history. It is generally agreed that directors and
officers mismanged the failing S&Ls. 7 Simple incompetence by inexperienced officers and managers combined with fraud resulted in poorly
conceived loans and investments, loans to officers and directors, sweetheart loans to affiliated businesses, altered books, bribery and outright
embezzlement. 8 Fraud, specifically, is implicated in approximately seventy percent of the failed institutions. 9 The issue before the court in
United States v. Davis '0 was whether an individual, who was not an officer,
director or an agent of a federally insured institution, could be prosecuted for misapplying funds under 18 U.S.C. § 657." Although the
Tenth Circuit had not addressed this issue, other circuits have given a
broad interpretation of section 657.12
In addition to criminal activity, negligent management of financial
institutions also contributed to the failure of banks and S&Ls. Although,
historically, corporate directors and officers have enjoyed broad discretion in exercising their fiduciary duties, 1 3 courts increasingly examine
7. Carl Felsenfeld, The Savings and Loan Crisis, 59 FORDHAM L. REV, S7, S34 (1991).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. 953 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2286 (1992).
11. Davis also raised several other unrelated issues on appeal. For a full discussion of
these issues see Davis, 953 F.2d at 1490-98.
12. In United States v. Prater, 805 F.2d 1441, 1446 (11 th Cir. 1986), the president of
a real estate subsidiary, solely owned by a savings and loan, was found to be "connected
with" the savings and loan under section 657 where the president had the authority to
initiate loans and the savings and loan board relied on him for accurate recommendation
concerning loans. Those who serve a federally insured institution, whether in an employment context or in some other position of trust, the Eleventh Circuit found, were "connected with" that institution under section 657. Id. See also United States v. Payne, 750
F.2d 844, 855 (11 th Cir. 1985).
A connection with a federally insured institution may result from control through
stock ownership, or control through the power to extend credit. However, such direct
control is not necessary to find that a defendant is connected with the institution. United
States v. Rice, 645 F.2d 691, 693 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 862 (1981) (consultant
retained by savings and loan to originate loans was "connected with" that institution,
notwithstanding that he had not right to approve loans); United States v. Edick, 432 F.2d
350, 352 (4th Cir. 1970) (employee of bank service corporation was connected with the
bank). In United States v. Garrett, 396 F.2d 489 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 952 (1968),
controlling stockholders of a bank were charged with misapplication of national bank
funds in connection with the purchase of mortgages by the bank. The mortgage sellers
paid large commissions to a nonbank corporation owned by the defendants who then distributed the money among themselves. Id. at 490. The defendants argued that since they
were not officers, directors, agents or employees of the bank, they were outside the reach
of the statute. Id The Fifth Circuit disagreed. After examining the connection between
the defendants and the bank, the court found that the defendants and their nominees
obtained control of the bank by acquiring the majority of its stock. Id. at 491. As controlling stockholders, the defendants had a fiduciary duty to both the bank and the minority
shareholders. Id. The Fifth Circuit concluded the "fact of ownership ... together with the
activity ... in furtherance of control demonstrates a connection with the bank within the
meaning of the statute." Id.
13. James J. Hanks, Jr., Evaluating Recent State Legislation on Directorand Officer Liability
Limitation and Indemnification, 43 Bus. LAw. 1207 (1988). "Courts interfere seldom to con-
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the propriety of corporate decisionmaking.
Financially distraught companies are frequent sources of litigation
challenging the actions of corporate directors and officers. 14 With the
onslaught of lawsuits, costs of director and officer (D&O) liability insurance increased dramatically. 15 As a result, many directors and officers
chose to resign rather than expose themselves to personal liability due
to inadequate D&O coverage. 16 Many states quickly responded to these
developments by enacting legislation limiting director and officer
personal liability. 17 The states limited liability by imposing lower liability standards, some requiring proof of conduct exceeding gross
negligence. ' 8
Utah, however, takes an opposite position. Under Utah law, an officer or director can be liable for ordinary negligence. 19 The issue
before the court in Canfield was whether section 1821(k) of FIRREA established a national liability standard of gross negligence for actions
brought by the FDIC, and thereby preempted the Utah law that permit20
ted such actions under a simple negligence standard.
trol such discretion intra vires the corporation, except where the directors are guilty of
misconduct equivalent to a breach of trust, or where they stand in a dual relation which
prevents an unprejudiced exercise ofjudgment." Id. (quoting United Copper Sec. Co. v.
Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263-64 (1917)). Thereafter, the business judgment rule was routinely invoked to validate directors and officers decisions and to insulate
them from personal liability. Id.
14. See, e.g., Fox v.Chase Manhattan Corp., No. 91JUV-0831, 1986 WL637 (Del. Ch.
Jan. 2, 1986) (Delaware Chancery Court approved a $32.5 million settlement of suit
against Chase Manhattan Corp. and six of its officers arising out of the collapse of Drysdale Government Securities); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. SeaFirst Corp., 891 F.2d 762
(9th Cir. 1989) (bank holding company and five of its officers agreed to entry ofjudgment
for $10 million).
15. Over the course of one year, D&O insurance increased an astonishing 360%. Insuring Directors, WALL ST. J., Mar, 21, 1986, at 31.
16. Hanks, supra note 13, at 1209.
17. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 23-1-35-1 (e) (1989)(willful misconduct or recklessness); Wis.
STAT. § 180.0828(1) (1992)(willful misconduct).
18. See sources cited supra note 17. See generally Hanks, supra note 13; Douglas M. Branson, Assault on Another Citadel: Attempts to Curtail the Fiduciary Standardof Loyalty Applicable to
CorporateDirectors, 3 FORDHAM L. REV. 375 (1988).
19. UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-840 (Supp. 1992).

20. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) provides:
A director or officer of an insured depository institution may be held personally
liable for monetary damages in any civilaction by, on behalf of, or at the requestor
direction of the Corporation, which action is prosecuted wholly or partially for
the benefit of the Corporation(1) acting as conservator or receiver of such institution,
(2) acting based upon a suit, claim, orcause of action purchased for, assigned
by, or otherwise conveyed by such receiver or conservator, or
(3) acting based upon a suit, claim, or causeof action based upon a suit,
claim, orcause of action purchased from, assigned by, or otherwise conveyed
in whole or inpart by an insured depository institution or its affiliate in connection withassistance provided under section 1823 of this title, for gross
negligence, including similar conduct or conduct that demonstrates a greater
disregard of a duty of care (than gross negligence) including intentional tortious conduct, as such terms are defined and determined underapplicable
State law. Nothing in this paragraph shall impair or affect any right of the
Corporation under other applicable law.
12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (Supp. 1 1989).
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United States v. Davis2 1
1.

Facts

United States v. Davis involved the theft of federally insured deposits
through a series of complex transactions containing elements of deception, collusion, conflicts of interest and self-dealing. 22 Defendants Don
C. Davis and Daniel M. Burke misapplied or diverted millions of dollars
at the expense of several banks and savings and loans, and ultimately the
23
United States Treasury.
Davis and Burke exercised control over the Guarantee Federal Bank
24
(GFB) as part of a group that controlled a majority block of stock.
Burke was a director of GFB, and although Davis was not a board member, he frequently gave financial advice to the board and attended board
meetings. 2 5 Davis and Burke influenced GFB president's decision to
purchase securities from bank holding companies in which Davis and
Burke had interests. 26 In reality, through a series of transactions, the
money was diverted to Davis and Burke. The United States District
Court for the District of Wyoming 27 convicted Davis and Burke of misapplying federally insured deposits under 18 U.S.C. § 657.28 On appeal, Davis argued his conviction was invalid because the prosecution
did not meet its burden and establish that Davis was an officer, agent, or
29
employee of a federally insured institution.
2.

Tenth Circuit Decision

The Tenth Circuit was unswayed by Davis' argument that only "officers, agents, or employees" who are "connected in any capacity with"
an insured institution may be found liable under section 657.30 The
court disagreed with Davis' construction of the statute, finding it too
21. 953 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2286 (1992).
22. Id. at 1486.
23. In addition to being charged with misapplying federally insured funds under 18
U.S.C. § 657, Davis and Burke were also charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy to commit offenses against, and to defraud the United States); 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (wire
fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1006 (making false entries in bank books and records or unlawful receipt of benefits). Davis was also charged with 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (overvaluing security and
making false statements). Davis, 953 F.2d at 1486.
24. Davis, 952 F.2d at 1487.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. United States v. Davis Nos. 89-8051, 89-8052, 90-8057, 90-8058 (D. Wyo. 1990)
(on file at Denv. U.L. Rev. offices).
28. Davis was convicted on fourteen counts including one count of conspiracy, five
counts of wire fraud, four counts of misapplying federally insured funds, two counts of
aiding an abetting false entries, one count of aiding and abetting in the unlawful receipt of
benefits, and one count of overvaluing securities. The jury convicted Burke on eleven
counts including one count of conspiracy, three counts of wire fraud, four counts of misapplying federally insured funds, two counts of make false entries and one count of unlawfully receiving benefits. Davis, 952 F.2d at 1486. Burke died soon after sentencing and
Davis petitioned the circuit for review. Id. at 1487.
29. Id. at 1488.
30. 18 U.S.C. § 657 (Supp. III 1991).
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narrow.3 1 To read the statute as Davis advocated would require the
court to ignore the Act's language: "[w]hoever, being an officer, agent or
employee of or connected in any capacity with." 3 2 The fact that Davis
had not formally been designated an agent of GFB did not preclude the
trier of fact from finding an agency relationship based upon conduct.3 3
Furthermore, the prosecution did not have to show that Davis was an
agent, but merely that he was "connected in any capacity with" an in34
sured financial institution.
The court explained that the "connected in any capacity with" language should be broadly interpreted in accordance with the congres35
sional resolve to protect federally insured institutions against fraud.
The court also pointed out that each case should be evaluated on its own
facts. 3 6 Based upon the control Davis exercised over GFB and his extensive participation in the affairs of GFB, the Tenth Circuit concluded
that Davis was "connected" with the institution within the meaning of
7
section 657.3
C.

38
FederalDeposit Ins. Corp. v. Canfield

1.

Facts

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., brought suit against the former directors and officers of Tracy Collins Bank and Trust, a Utah financial institution, seeking damages of $7 million for imprudent loans made
or approved by the defendants, and damages for waste of bank assets
and mismanagement. 39 The defendant officers and directors argued
that section 1821 (k) preempts state law and bars the FDIC from seeking
damages from officers and directors for any conduct less than gross negligence. 40 The FDIC asserted that section 1821(k) preserved the ability
of the FDIC to sue, when authorized by state law, for damages against
officers and directors for ordinary negligence. 4 1 The FDIC maintained
its interpretation was consistent with the objectives of FIRREA. The
district court examined the language of section 1821(k), its legislative
history and the public policy arguments advanced by both parties, and
reached an opposite conclusion, holding that section 1821(k) created a
national standard of gross negligence, and thereby preempted conflict31. Id. at 1489.
32. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 657).
33. Davis, 953 F.2d at 1488.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1489. Cf United States v. Ratchford, 942 F.2d 702, 705 (10th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1185 (1992). The Tenth Circuit held that a property manager who diverted funds from an apartment complex owned by two savings and loan associations was
sufficiently connected to federally insured institutions to support conviction under § 657.
36. Davis, 953 F.2d at 1489.
37. Id. at 1989-90.
38. 967 F.2d 443 (10th Cir.) cert. dismissed, 113 S. Ct. 516 (1992).
39. Canfield, 763 F. Supp. at 534. See also supra note 4.
40. Canfield, 763 F. Supp. at 534. Under Utah law, the directors and officer would be
personally liable for money damage for simple negligence.
41. Id.
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ing state law. 42

2.

Tenth Circuit Decision

On appeal, the Tenth Circuit mirrored the lower court's analysis of
section 1821(k). However, the conclusions were markedly different.
Following the district court's analysis, the appellate court began with the
43
plain language of the statute.
According to the Tenth Circuit, the language used in section
1821 (k) to describe the potential liability of officers and directors belied
the creation of an exclusive national liability standard. 44 The first sentence of the statute states that "a director or officer may be held personally liable for monetary damages... for gross negligence."'4 5 The court
focused its attention on the word "may", stating that " 'may' is a permissive term, and it does not imply a limitation on the standards of officer
and director liability." '46 To affirm the lower court's construction of section 1821(k), the appellate court concluded it would have to construe
the first sentence as saying that "an officer or director may only be held
personally liable for gross negligence."14 7 This would require the insertion of a word into the statute, which the court refused to do.4 8 Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit found the last sentence of the statute consistent
with this interpretation. 49 "Other applicable law", in the last sentence,
means all "other applicable law"-state, federal or any other. 50 Any
other law providing that an officer or director may be held liable for
simple negligence survives, such a law being "other applicable law." 5'
Construing the statute to bar application of such "other law" would im52
pair the FDIC's enforcement rights.
In further support of this conclusion, the court relied on the general
rule of statutory construction that "the statute should be read as a
whole." 5 3s The court observed that "[n]owhere does the statute announce its intention to create a national standard of liability." '54 In fact,
the statute's reliance on state law to define gross negligence contra42. Id. at 540.
43. Id. at 445. (the Court began with the plain language of the law) (quoting United
States v. Morgan, 922 F.2d 1495, 1496 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 11l S.Ct. 2803 (1991)).
44. Canfield, 967 F.2d at 446.
45. Id. at 446 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k)).
46. Id. (citing Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 626-27 (1987)) (the Court refused to read
"may" as establishing anything other than discretionary power).
47. Canfield, 967 F.2d at 446.
48. Id. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Lightfoot, 938 F.2d 65, 66-67 (7th Cir. 1991)
("may" does not mean "may only").
49. Canfield, 967 F.2d at 446.
50. Id. See also Small v. Britton, 500 F.2d 299, 301 (10th Cir. 1974)(reliance must be
placed on unambiguous statutes "evident meaning"); Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct.
2242 (1992)(the Court read "applicable bankruptcy law" in 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2) to include both state and federal law).
51. Canfield, 967 F.2d at 446.
52. Id.
53. Id. (citing 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.05

(5th ed. 1992)).
54. Canfield, 967 F.2d at 447.
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dicted the proposition that FIRREA establishes a national standard because state law definitions of gross negligence vary. 5 5 In contrast, other
sections of FIRREA specifically mention the applicability of state law or
56
federal law.
Next, the court reviewed the legislative history behind the statute
and found it consistent with its interpretation of the plain meaning of
the statute. Specifically, the court followed the senate's lead finding that
section 1821 "does not prevent the FDIC from pursuing claims under
State law or other applicable Federal law, if such law permits the officers
for violating a lower
or directors of a financial institution to be sued
57
standard of care, such as simple negligence."
Finally, the Tenth Circuit addressed the public policy arguments
raised by the defendants and concluded that these arguments were
raised in the wrong forum. 58 By inserting the "other applicable law"
verbiage, Congress intended to let the individual states decide the propriety of a simple negligence standard. 5 9 By doing so, Congress allowed
states to consider the implications of problems such as the difficulty of
obtaining D&O insurance and its effect on attracting competent and aggressive business leaders. 60 In this case, the court's only consideration
was whether the statute prohibited the FDIC from pursuing the Utah
action against these defendants; not the merits of a simple negligence
61
standard.
3.

Dissenting Opinions

62
Judges Brorby and Moore file separate dissenting opinions.
Brorby's dissent attacked the majority's analysis of legislative intent stating that "[flew are so naive as to believe there exists but a single correct
interpretation of any given statute." 63 While Brorby believed the majority opinion supportable, he found the better interpretation of section

55. Id. "[T]here is ... no generally accepted meaning [of gross negligence]." Id. (W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 34, at 212 (5th ed.
1984).
56. Parts of § 1821 of the statute refer specifically to the other bodies of law it
touches. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 182 1(c)(3)(B) ("powers imposed by State law"); § 182 1(c)(4)
("notwithstanding any other provision of Federal law, the law of any State"). Similarly,
when the statute refers to itself, it does so with specificity. See, e.g., § 1821 (d)(2)(I) (FDIC
may "take any action authorized by this chapter"); § 1821(e)(3)(C)(ii) ("except as otherwise specifically provided in this section"). Additionally, when the statute refers to the
whole universe of other laws, it uses the same language as that in section 1821 (k). See also
§ 1821(e)(12)(B) ("No provision of this paragraph may be construed as impairing or affecting any right . . . under other applicable law."),

57. Canfield, 967 F.2d at 448-49 n.6 (quoting 135 CONG. REC. S6912 (daily ed. June
19, 1989)).
58. Id. at 448.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 448-50. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
61. Canfield, 967 F.2d at 448.
62. Id. at 449 (Brorby, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 449 n. 1. For nearly every canon of statutory construction, there exists an
opposing canon which supports a contrary interpretation. Id. (citing Karl N. Llewellyn,
Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decisions and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes are to be
Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950)).
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1821(k) in the district court's opinion which not only gave effect to the
plain meaning of the statute, but also served Congress' longstanding
64
goal to achieve uniform administration of federal financial institutions.
This interpretation heeds important public policy concerns underlying
FIRREA. 6 5 Therefore, Brorby concluded that section 1821(k) defined
"an exclusive, uniform federal threshold of gross negligence for the personal liability of bank directors and officers named in civil damage suits
' 66
brought by the FDIC."
D.

Analysis of Banking Cases

The results in Canfield and Davis are not surprising. The Tenth Circuit decisions in the banking cases show very broad construction and
deference to the statutes relating to the mismanagement and failure of
banks and savings and loans. It is very clear that the court responded to
the public outrage over the saving and loan bailout and its astronomical
cost to taxpayers. Although it is too late to correct these past abuses,
the court sent a strong message that this type of conduct will not go
unchallenged or unpunished. Although the Tenth Circuit opinions in
Canfield and Davis clearly reflect public sentiment, the decisions are well
reasoned and supported by a thoughtful analysis of precedent and statutory interpretation doctrine.
The precedential decision in Canfield effects officers and directors of
financial institutions, placing them on notice that their managerial decisions require considerable deliberation. Challenges to perceived negligent conduct in the management of financial institutions will continue
with the courts increasingly willing to scrutinize corporate decisionmaking and award damages when appropriate. It will be interesting to observe the Canfield decision's impact on bank and S&L ability to attract
competent management. We may see greater hesitation by officers and
directors to accept positions in an industry where they are held to a
higher decision making standard.
Unlike the Canfield opinion, where the Tenth Circuit engaged in independent analysis, the Davis decision relied heavily on cases in other
circuits to conclude that Davis was "connected" with GFB for the purpose of section 657.67 In Davis, the Tenth Circuit Court primarily relied
on a substantially analogous case decided by the Fifth Circuit in Garrettv.
68
United States.
The Davis opinion, like the Canfield opinion, promotes careful scrutiny of bank officials' conduct. Davis gives a very broad interpretation of
the class of individuals that are "connected with" a federally insured in64. Id.
65. Id. at 451.
66. Id at 452. Judge Moore concurred with Judge Brorby's dissent but wrote separately to emphasize his belief that if Congress had intended to establish a standard of
simple negligence for officer and director liability, it would have stated it unequivocally.
To conclude otherwise "defies my form of fundamental logic." Id.(Moore, J., dissenting).
67. See supra note 12.
68. 396 F.2d 489 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 952 (1968). See supra note 12.
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stitution for the purpose of criminal responsibility under 18 U.S.C.
§ 657. Not only will officers, directors and agents of a financial institution be held accountable for misapplying federally insured funds, but
those individuals who are less formally and more remotely associated
with the federally insured institution are now firmly within the grasp of
this statute.
III.

LETrERS OF CREDIT

A. Background
The letter of credit was developed as a payment mechanism to alleviate the tension that exists between sellers, who do not want to give up
possession of goods before payment is made, and buyers, who want to
have control of goods before payment is tendered. In general, the letter
of credit transaction is a three party arrangement. An "issuer" (generally a bank) agrees to pay conforming drafts presented under the letter
of credit; a bank customer or "account party" orders the letter of credit
and dictates its terms; and a "beneficiary" to whom the letter of credit is
issued along with the corresponding right to collect monies under the
letter of credit by presenting drafts and making proper demand on the
issuer. 69 The letter of credit is normally irrevocable 70 and contains an
expiration date.
This arrangement results in the beneficiary's assurance of payment
because the irrevocable obligation of the account party's bank runs
solely to the beneficiary. This obligation requires performance even
when a dispute arises between the account party and the beneficiary and
the account party requests the issuing bank not to pay. 7 1 - Furthermore,
the bank must pay even if the account party is insolvent, cannot, or re72
fuses to reimburse the bank for payment to the beneficiary.
Today two broad categories of letters of credit exist; the "commercial letter of credit" used most commonly in international business
transactions to reinforce the mode of payment 73 and the "standby letter
of credit" used as a backup against default on obligations. 74 In the past
decade, with bank failure, customer failure, beneficiary failure, and the
development of standby letters of credit, a considerable volume of litigation over these instruments developed. 75 The defensive positions taken
by attorneys, and the poor draftsmanship of letters of credit reflected in
these cases illustrate the existing misunderstandings regarding the legal
nature of the letters of credit. 76 It is clear that Article 5 of the Uniform
69.
1985).
70.
71.
72.

Arbest Const. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 777 F.2d 581, 583 (10th Cir.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 5-103(l)(a)(B)(1991).

Id. §§ 5-114(1) to -114(2).
Id. § 5-114(3).

73. JAMESJ. WHrrE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 19-1, at 806

(3d ed.
74.
75.
76.

1988).
Id. § 19-1, at 809.
Id. § 19-2, at 812.
Id.

DENVER UNIVERSITY I W REVIEW

[Vol. 70:4

Commercial Code, pertaining to letters of credit, is no longer equal to
its task. 7 7 In the case that follows, under the veil of executive orders
freezing Iraqi assets in the United States, the Tenth Circuit set out to
determine if Iraq, as an account party to a letter of credit, had a property
interest in a payment made to a beneficiary who breached the underlying contract.
B.

8
Centrifugal Casting Machine Co. v. American Bank & Trust Co. 7

1. Facts
Iraq was an account party to a letter of credit and a beneficiary of a
standby letter of credit. 79 These letters were issued as payment mechanisms in connection with a contract between Centrifugal Casting
Machine (CCM), an American company, and State Machinery Trading
Company (SMTC), an agency of the Iraqi government. 80
The parties agreed on an irrevocable letter of credit as the form of
payment between SMTC to CCM, for the benefit of CCM in the contact
amount. 8 1 The Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) issued the letter of credit
and entitled CCM to draw ten percent of the contract amount as a downpayment ($2.7 million).8 2 Additionally, the parties agreed to the issuance of a standby letter of credit in the amount of ten percent of the
contract amount ($2.7 million) made by CCM for the benefit of
SMTC. 8 3 This standby letter of credit was available to repay SMTC the
amount of the downpayment upon receipt of proof that CCM had not
performed under the contract.8 4 SMTC attempted to draw on the
standby letter of credit, however, the attempt was not accompanied by
the requisite proof of CCM's nonperformance. Consequently the
drawdown was not honored before the expiration date set out in the
letter. 8 5
The United States intervened in suits involving parties to the letter
of credit and asserted that Iraq had a property interest in $2.7 million
deposited by CCM with ABT as security for the standby letter. The
United States claimed the bank account containing the $2.7 million was
subject to Executive Orders freezing assets of the Iraqi government. 86
77. See JOHN M. STOCKTON & FREDERICK H. MILLER, SALES AND LEASES OF GOODS IN A
NUTSHELL 117 (3d ed. 1992); See also Task Force Report, An Examination of U.C.C. Article 5
(Letters of Credit), 45 Bus. LAw. 1521 (1990).
78. 966 F.2d 1348 (10th Cir. 1992).
79. Id. at 1349.
80. Id.

81. Id.
82. Id. at 1350.
83. Id.
84. This standby letter of credit was issued by Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL) to
American Bank of Tulsa (ABT), CCM's bank, as the account party, and made payable to
Rafidain Bank, which in turn issued a $2.7 million guarantee to SMTC. Id. CCM deposited
its downpayment under the letter of credit with ABT as security to protect ABT against
any obligation it might incur on the standby letter of credit. Id.
85. Id.

86. Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August of 1992, President Bush issued two
Executive Orders blocking any transfer of property in which Iraq held an interest. See
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The district court found no valid draw had been made on the
standby letter of credit, the letter had expired by its own terms, and that
87
CCM, ABT and BNL had no liability under the standby letter of credit.
In doing so, the court rejected the claim of the United States.
2.

Tenth Circuit Decision

On appeal, the United States argued that the freeze of Iraqi assets
furthered the national policy adopted to punish Iraq by preventing economic benefits from transactions with American citizens and companies. 88 Furthermore, the freeze preserved Iraqi assets for use as
bargaining chips in negotiations and sources for compensation for
American claims against Iraq. 89 Although the court found the policy
arguments compelling, and agreed that Iraqi property interests should
be construed in the broadest sense, the court remained unpersuaded
that the facts in this case gave rise to a property interest in Iraq when it
would not otherwise be cognizable under governing legal principles. 90
The asset in issue, according to the reasoning of the United States,
was the down payment Iraq made on the contract with CCM. Since
CCM did not perform on the contract, it was argued that Iraq had an
interest in this downpayment based on breach of contract. 9 1 However,
the court disagreed with this reasoning finding it contrary to the principles governing the financial mechanisms chosen by the parties to guar92
antee payment under the contract.
The Tenth Circuit began its analysis by examining the relationships
of the parties under the standby letter of credit. 93 A letter of credit thus
involves three legally distinct relationships: "between the issuer and the
account party, the issuer and the beneficiary, and the account party and
the beneficiary (this last relationship being the underlying business deal
Exec. Order No. 12,722, 55 Fed. Reg. 31,803 (1990); Exec. Order No. 12,724, 55 Fed.
Reg. 33,089 (1990). These orders were implemented by regulations promulgated by the
Secretary of the Treasury, through the Office of Foreign Assets Control. See 31 C.F.R.
§§ 575.201-.806 (1991). Under these regulations, "no property or interests in property of
the Government of Iraq that are in the United States .. .may be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn or otherwise dealt in." Id. § 5 7 5.201(a).
87. Centrifugal Casting Machine Co., Inc., v. American Bank & Trust Co., and Iraq,
No. 91-5150 (N.D. Okla. 1991) (on file at Deny. U.L. Rev. offices).
88. Centrifugal, 966 F.2d at 1350.
89. Id. at 1350-51.
90. Id. at 1351.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Because the term "letter of credit" was not defined in either the Executive Orders
or the implementing regulations, the court used the meaning ordinarily used by the courts
and parties dealing with this kind of arrangement. See Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 480
(1949).
[A] letter of credit involves three parties: (1) an issuer (generally a bank) who
agrees to pay conforming drafts presented under the letter of credit; (2) a bank
customer or 'account party' who orders the letter of credit and dictates its terms;
and (3) a beneficiary to who the letter of credit is issued, who can collect monies
under the letter of credit by presenting drafts and making proper demand on the
issuer.
Centrifugal, 966 F.2d at 1351 (quoting Arbest Constr. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
777 F.2d 581, 583 (10th Cir. 1985)).
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giving rise to the issuance of the letter of credit)." '94 In this case, CBI
was the issuer, SMTC was the account party, and CCM was the
beneficiary. 95
The court pointed out two interrelated features of the letter of
credit providing its unique value in the marketplace, and are critical to
the analysis of the United States claim. First, "[t]he simple result [of a
letter of credit] is that the issuer substitutes its credit, preferred by the
beneficiary, for that of the account party." 96 The issuing bank pays the
beneficiary out of its own funds and then must look to the account party
for reimbursement. 9 7 Second, the issuer's obligation to pay on a letter
of credit is entirely independent of the underlying commercial transaction between the beneficiary and the account party. 9 8 Furthermore, the
issuer must honor a proper demand for payment from the beneficiary
even if that beneficiary breached the underlying contract. 9 9 This principal of independence is universally viewed as essential to the proper
functioning of a letter of credit and to its particular value, i.e., certainty
of payment.' 0 0
This assurance of payment gives letters of credit a central role in
commercial dealings, and gives them a particular value in international
transactions, "in which sophisticated investors knowingly undertake
such risks as political upheaval or contractual breach in return for the
benefits in return for the benefits to be reaped from international
trade."1 0 ' Therefore, the courts have concluded that the purpose of the
letter of credit would be defeated by examining the merits of the under02
lying contract dispute to determine whether the letter should be paid. 1
After analyzing the characteristics of a letter of credit, the court
94. Centrigal,966 F.2d at 1351.
95. Additionally, BNL was a confirming bank and thus became directly liable to CCM.
A "confirming bank" is one which will either itself honor the letter of credit already issued
by another bank or guarantees that such a credit will be honored by the issuer or a third
bank. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 5-103(l)(f)(1963). "A confirming bank by confirming a
letter of credit becomes directly obligated on the credit to the extent of its confirmation as
though it were its issuer and acquires the rights of the issuer." Id. § 5-107(2).
96. Arbest Constr. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 777 F.2d 581, 583 (10th Cir.
1985). See also Republic Nat'l Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 894 F.2d 1255, 1258 (11 th
Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 308 (1990) (letter of credit gives the beneficiary and irrevocable
right to payment, not from the account party, whom might become insolvent or refuse to
pay, but from the issuing bank); Airline Reporting Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 832 F.2d 823,
826 (4th Cir. 1987) (issuer replaces customer's promise to pay with its own promise to
pay); Pringle-Associated Mort. Corp. v. Southern Nat'l Bank, 571 F.2d 871, 874 (5th Cir.
1978) (beneficiary's claim based on letter of credit, not on agreement between issuer and
account party and not on the underlying contract).
97. See generally Republic Nat'l Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 894 F.2d 1255, 1257-58
(1 th Cir. 1990) (issuer which has honored demand for payment is entitled to immediate
repayment).
98. Centrifugal, 966 F.2d at 1352. See also Ward Petroleum Corp. v. Federal Deposit
Ins. Corp., 903 F.2d 1297, 1299-1300 (10th Cir. 1990).
99. Centrifugal, 966 F.2d at 1352.
100. Id. See, e.g., Wood v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 888 F.2d 313 (3d. Cir. 1989);
Tradax Petroleum Am., Inc. v. Coral Petroleum, Inc., 878 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1989).
101. Centrifugal, 966 F.2d at 1352 (quoting Enterprise Int'l, Inc. v. Corporacion Estatal
Petrolera Ecuatoriana, 762 F.2d 464, 474 (5th Cir. 1985)).
102. Id. at 1353.
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concluded that Iraq did not have a property interest in the money CCM
received under the letter.10 3 The court rejected the contention that Iraq
had a property interest in this money as an alleged contract payment
made by Iraq, recoverable by Iraq because CCM breached the contract.' 0 4 In doing so, the United States made a breach of contract claim
on behalf of Iraq that Iraq never made, created a remedy for the contracting parties in derogation of the remedy they themselves provided' 0 5 and, most importantly, disregarded the controlling legal
principles with respect to letters of credit. 10 6
In support of the decision, the court emphasized that the payment
to CCM under the letter of credit was not made by Iraq, but rather, it
was made by the confirming bank, BNL. 10 7 Furthermore, no legal authority supported the contention that Iraq, as an account party on a letter of credit, had a property interest in the beneficiary's payment based
on the beneficiary's alleged breach of the underlying contract.1 0 8 In
fact, such a conclusion would be antithetical to the principle of independence that is universally recognized by the courts as crucial to the use of
the letter of credit as a financing device.' 0 9 Reliance on the underlying
contract is contrary to the unique value of the letter of credit."10 Payment certainty would be undermined by concluding that the account
party had a right to that payment by virtue of the underlying contract
prior to litigation on that contract."'I The beneficiary's bargained for
right to retain the payment pending contract litigation would be effec12
tively frustrated.
In conclusion, the court reiterated its recognition that Iraqi assets
113
and property interests should be construed in the broadest sense.
However, the court declined to restructure the essential characteristics
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. The parties themselves provided a remedy through a standby letter of credit in
favor of the agent of SMTC, by which SMTC could recover the down payment in the event
of a breach by CCM. Id. at 1353 n.6. Furthermore, the parties agreed to an expiration date
for the standby letter of credit. Id. The district court found that this letter expired under
its own terms before a proper draw was made upon it. Id. The United States did not
appeal this ruling. Id.
106. Id. at 1353.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. The United States' reliance on Itek Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 704 F.2d 1 (1st.
Cir. 1983), aff'd, 730 F.2d 19 (1984), was not persuasive because that case was factually
distinguishable in significant respects. In Itek, the First Circuit Court was concerned with
essentially identical Executive Orders and regulations with the exception that the assets
being frozen were Iran's. Under the letter of credit in that case, Iran was the beneficiary
under the letter and thus Iran had a cognizable beneficial interest in the letter. Id. at 8.
The position of Iran in Itek is analogous to Iraq's position as beneficiary of the standby
letter of credit in this case. Once again the Tenth Circuit Court emphasized that the
United States did not appeal the district court's ruling that any right that Iraq had under
the standby letter of credit was extinguished when it expired. Centriugal,966 F.2d at 1354
n.7.

113. Centrifugal, 966 F.2d at 1353.
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of a letter of credit in order to create a property interest in the payment
made to CCM under the letter of credit. 114 "The national interest is not
furthered by creating a property interest out of conditions that would
not otherwise generate such an interest, particularly when we must do
so at the expense of a critical and unique devise of international
trade."''15

3.

Analysis

As stated previously, widespread confusion exists in the legal community concerning the use of letters of credit. 1 6 Our economy has become more global in nature, and as a result, the use of letters of credit
has expanded dramatically in the past decade. Increased use results in a
predictable increase in litigation construing letters of credit. As in the
Centrifugal case, the transactions underlying the use of letters of credit
are often very complex, involving numerous international parties and
large sums of money.
In Centrifugal, the Tenth Circuit perceptively recognized the confusing issues surrounding letters of credit as well as the unique qualities
that make them a valuable tool in foreign commerce. Unlike the United
States, as intervenor, the Tenth Circuit remained focused on the issues
of the case and did not involve itself in patriotic fervor by trying to create an Iraqi interest where one did not exist.
The Centrifugal opinion was a successful attempt to shed light and
provide understanding of the complexities and desirable characteristics
of this payment device. The Tenth Circuit's decision was based on well
entrenched law governing letters of credit, providing a simple and understandable analytical framework that practitioners can turn to examine issues raised by the use of letters of credit.
IV.

CONCLUSION

During the 1992 survey period, the Tenth Circuit opinions in Canfield and Davis continued the court's trend of empowering the FDIC and
federal prosecutors by broadly interpreting statutes relating to the failures and abuses in the banking and savings and loan industry. Unlike
the Davis decision, which was based on established law in other circuits,
the Canfield opinion is significant in that it is a case of first impression at
the appellate level.
The Tenth Circuit based its opinion in Centrifugal, like the Davis decision, upon established legal doctrine. However, the opinion is notable
because it recognizes the widespread confusion surrounding the use of
letters of credit as well as the special value of these instruments in inter114.
115.

Id.
Id. at 1354.

116. See supra notes 73-77.
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national commerce. The opinion provides a well organized analysis of
this financing device and its use.
Timothy K Jordan

